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Abstract
This note compares the responses of consumption and prices to the COVID-19
shock and another large-scale natural disaster that hit Japan, the Tohoku earthquake
in March 2011. The comparison shows that the responses of supermarket sales and
prices at a daily frequency during the two crises are quite similar: (1) the year-on-year
rate of sales growth increased quickly and reached a peak of 20 percent two weeks after
the outbreak of COVID-19 in Japan, which is quite similar to the response immediately
after the earthquake; (2) the items consumers purchased at supermarkets in these two
crisis are almost identical; (3) the year-on-year rate of consumer price ination for
goods rose by 0.6 percentage points in response to the coronavirus shock, compared
to 2.2 percentage points in the wake of the earthquake. However, evidence suggests
that whereas people expected higher ination for goods and services in the wake of
the earthquake, they expect lower ination in response to the coronavirus shock. This
dierence in ination expectations suggests that the economic deterioration due to
COVID-19 should be viewed as driven mainly by an adverse aggregate demand shock
to face-to-face service industries such as hotels and leisure, transportation, and retail,
rather than as driven by an aggregate supply shock.
1 The Spread of COVID-19 in Japan and the World
The spread of COVID-19 is still gaining momentum. The number of those infected in
Japan started to rise from the last week of February, and the spread of the virus began
to gradually aect everyday life, as exemplied by increasingly empty streets in Ginza. In
March, the outbreak spread to Europe and the United States, and stock markets in the
United States and other country began to drop sharply on a daily basis, leading to market
turmoil reminiscent of the global nancial crisis. At the time of writing (March 29), the
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Dow Jones Index of the New York Stock Exchange had dropped by 35%, while the Nikkei
Index had fallen by 30%.
Governments and central banks have responded swiftly. The US central bank, the Fed-
eral Reserve, reduced its benchmark rate by 50 basis points on March 3 and another 100
basis points on March 15, moving to a zero interest rate almost in one fell swoop. At the
same time, it initiated quantitative easing. Following suit, the BOJ at an extraordinary
monetary policy meeting on March 16 decided to provide ample liquidity by raising the
annual purchase target for exchange traded funds (ETFs) from Y6 trillion to Y12 trillion.
Moreover, the European Central Bank (ECB) on March 18 decided on a new asset purchase
program. On the scal front, the United States on March 27 passed a $2 trillion stimulus
budget that includes direct payments of $1,200 to individuals, while the European Com-
mission of the European Union (EU) has suspended strict rules on member states' public
decits. Japan is also preparing emergency economic measures, including cash payments
to individuals. However, despite a surge in response to the series of policy measures in
advanced countries, stock markets remain substantially below their pre-crisis levels.
Against this background, the view that the coronavirus shock will lead to an economic
crisis equal to or greater than the global nancial crisis is rapidly spreading. However,
I believe that the coronavirus shock diers from previous economic crises, including the
global nancial crisis, in at least two respects.
Suddenness of the shock The rst is the suddenness and speed of the shock. Economic
crises are generally not anticipated in advance and typically spread as people helplessly
watch events unfold. However, in the case of the coronavirus crisis, the extent of the shock
is without precedent. There is probably no one who at the beginning of the year would
have predicted the coronavirus shock. In addition, in the four weeks or so since infections
in Japan took o in late February, the coronavirus shock has completely changed the
economic landscape. This crisis is dierent in terms of its suddenness. Since the global
nancial crisis was caused by human failure, its speed was within the bounds of human
comprehension. However, during this crisis, it is the spread of the virus that determines
the speed, which is far beyond human everyday comprehension.
Synchronization of people's behavior The second characteristic is that people's be-
havior is extremely synchronized. To protect oneself from the novel coronavirus, it is
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necessary to avoid contact with others. People are doing everything they can to do so,
such as avoiding crowded places, not attending events, and not using public transport. As
a result, almost everyone is taking the same actions.
Theaters and restaurants that are usually popular and dicult to get tickets or reser-
vations for are empty and would be easy to enjoy. Under normal circumstances, one would
expect people to take this opportunity and try these places. This would be the normal
economic mechanism. However, during the current crisis, no one is taking a chance and
everyone follows the same behavior and stays at home. The government's request for
organizers to voluntarily cancel events has reinforced this trend.
In the midst of an economic crisis, it is not uncommon for synchronized behavior to
occur in the form of one person's behavior being followed by others. However, the degree
of synchronization during this crisis is of a dierent order of magnitude from a normal
economic crisis. Moreover, the current crisis also diers from the past in that people
choose the same behavior on their own accord rather than to conform with others.
It has only been a month since the coronavirus shock emerged and its full nature is
still unclear. However, various kinds of data are starting shed some light. In this note, I
will outline the features that have come into view and will use these as a starting point to
consider the future.
2 Economic Impacts of the Coronavirus Shock
Supply shocks Let me start by reviewing the economic impact of the novel coronavirus.
The reason for the economic impact of the novel coronavirus is that it limits contact with
others. People want to avoid contact with others in order to protect themselves and try to
engage in economic activities within the bounds of this constraint. This has the following
eects on supply and demand.
Starting with the supply side, since people (=workers) stay at home, they cannot engage
in production activities. Of course, some work can be carried out remotely, so that staying
at home does not mean that all production activities cease. However, work such as working
on a production line in a factory cannot be done remotely since it requires collaboration.
Moreover, even activities that can be easily carried out remotely, such as university classes,
have elements that can only be conveyed face-to-face, so that productivity falls.
A decline in production can also occur for reasons other than people staying at home.
Deaths through viral infections mean that the number of workers declines. This happened
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in the pandemic of a hundred years ago, the Spanish u, which started in 1918 and ended
in 1919. The Spanish u is thought to have killed 2% of the global population, and deaths
were concentrated among those in their prime working years, causing a fall in production.
Loss of supply capacity also aects wages and prices. According to a recent study by
Robert Barro et al., the decline in the labor supply due to the 1918 pandemic raised wages
and prices of goods and services by about 5%.1
It is said that the death rate of COVID-19 is lower than that of the Spanish u, and
that deaths are concentrated among the elderly rather than the working age population. In
this regard, the coronavirus pandemic diers from the Spanish u, and at least at present
we are not yet in a situation where production is falling due to deaths from the coronavirus.
Demand shocks Turning to the demand side, people (=consumers) staying at home
leads to a slowdown in consumption activities. Of particular concern is services consump-
tion. There are numerous ways to minimize contact with others when purchasing goods,
such as shopping online. However, this is not the case for services. Contact with sta or
other customers is inevitable. A typical example is entertainment such as watching sports
events or going to the movies. Moreover, when using transportation services such as trains
and airplanes, contact with others is inevitable.
Firms that provide such services are diverse and, in terms of conventional categories,
belong to industries such as hotels and leisure, transportation, retail, etc. Until now,
one would not have considered bunching these industries together into one category. The
epicenter of the global nancial crisis, for example, was the banking industry, which could
be referred to using just this one term; however, during the current crisis, such labelling is
impossible, which makes it more dicult to comprehend the nature of the crisis. In this
note, I will refer to these services collectively as face-to-face (F2F) industries.
Another channel through which coronavirus infections can aect aggregate demand is
the increase in uncertainty. It is known that when people are faced with serious uncertainty
and no one knows what the future holds, they assume the worst and then choose the best
action based on this assumption.2 During the current crisis, people assumed the worst,
leading to drastic changes in demand, resulting in the stockpiling of cup noodles and toilet
1Robert Barro, Jose F. Ursua, and Joanna Weng, \The Coronavirus and the Great Inuenza Epidemic:
Lessons from the `Spanish Flu' for the Coronavirus's Potential Eects on Mortality and Economic Activity,"
AEI Economics Working Paper 2020-02. March 16, 2020.
2See, for example, Kiyohiko G. Nishimura, and Hiroyuki Ozaki, \Economics of Pessimism and Opti-
mism," Springer Books, 2017.
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paper.
Which dominates? The coronavirus shock is both a supply and a demand shock, but
knowing which of these is more salient is a key issue for understanding how the coronavirus
aects the economy. Necessary policy responses dier depending on whether the shock to
supply or demand is more important.
Distinguishing which of the two is more important is straightforward. All we need
to do is look at the direction of price changes. Prices should go up if the contraction in
supply dominates. Conversely, prices should fall if the decline in demand outweighs the
drop in supply. For example, in the case of the Spanish u a hundred years ago, prices, as
mentioned, rose, showing that the supply shock dominated. In terms of a recent example
for Japan, when the Tohoku earthquake struck in 2011, GDP fell sharply and prices rose.
This is another example where the shock to supply was dominant. In contrast, during the
2008 global nancial crisis, prices fell along with the decline in GDP in developed countries
including Japan. This indicates that the demand shock was dominant.
As will be seen in more detail below, recent data indicate that in advanced economies
including Japan, GDP and prices have fallen in tandem, strongly suggesting that the shock
to aggregate demand is dominant. In terms of a policy response, this means that the key
issue is how to make up for this shortage of aggregate demand.
Temporary public health damage but permanent economic damage An impor-
tant issue both for supply and demand is how long the economic damage of the coronavirus
pandemic will last. In the case of the global nancial crisis, negative or sluggish economic
growth lasted for six years from the end of 2008 to the end of 2014. In the case of the
coronavirus shock, the stock market is pricing in a similar period of economic recession or
stagnation.
If the coronavirus pandemic itself were to last for six years, it would not be surprising if
economic stagnation lasted for a similar period. However, as far as I am aware, no medical
professional expects the pandemic to last this long. Looking back at the Spanish u a
hundred years ago, the outbreak began in the spring of 1918. The initial outbreak was
followed by a second wave in the fall of 1918, a third wave in the spring of 1919, and the
pandemic nally ended in the summer of 1919. Thus, the Spanish u lasted for about
a year and a half. The current pandemic could probably be resolved more quickly with
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modern medical technology.
If the underlying shock - the spread of the virus - is transient, the economy should
recover in a V-shape once the pandemic has been brought under control, in which case the
extent of the fall in stock prices seems exaggerated. Investors with ample funds should
rush to buy stocks during this bargain sale in the expectation of rising stock prices once
the pandemic has been resolved.
For this reason, some say that the stock market has been gripped by panic and investors
have been unable to make calm decisions. If this is the case, investors should come to their
senses at some point and start buying furiously, so all we need to do is wait. However,
perhaps investors have not lost their senses and maybe expect that even if the shock due
to the pandemic itself may be transient, it could be amplied by events such as large-scale
bankruptcies and concomitant damage to the nancial system, resulting in lasting economic
damage. It cannot be ruled out that investors - in the process of carefully collecting micro-
information on individual companies - are catching a whi of permanent damage to the
economy.
3 Consumption and Prices in Japan since the Outbreak of
COVID-19
What credit card data tell us about current consumption patterns To obtain
a rst tentative sense of the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic, I use various
kinds of data from February onward, when the outbreak started to gather pace in Japan,
to examine (1) whether the coronavirus shock is primarily a demand or a supply shock,
and (2) whether the presumably transient pandemic may cause lasting economic damage.
The most useful way to examine the impact of the coronavirus shock on consumption
is to use credit card transaction data. Figure 1 shows how credit card spending in the
rst half of March (March 1-15) diered from the second half of January, just before the
coronavirus shock. The expenditure data are based on JCB card transaction data and are
calculated using the transactions of one million JCB active credit card users from among
the total of 100 million JCB card members.
The red bars show expenditure on services, while the blue bars represent spending on
goods. In services, travel spending has fallen substantially by 57% compared to the second
half of January, while spending on most other services such as eating out and transportation
has also declined. Thus, spending on F2F industries has dropped sharply. An important
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thing to highlight is that the decline in spending in F2F industries is mainly due to a
decline in the number of consumers spending on those services (i.e., the extensive margin)
rather than due to a decline in the average of spending on those services per person (i.e.,
the intensive margin). For example, the extensive margin associated with the decline in
travel spending is 47%, while the corresponding intensive margin is only 10%. Turning to
spending on goods, on the other hand, spending at supermarkets has increased signicantly,
reecting stockpiling. E-commerce, which allows buyers to avoid contact with others, has
also increased. Overall, total spending (green bar) has declined by 14 percent reecting
the substantial decline in F2F service purchases.
The fall in spending on F2F services represents an aggreagte demand shock. On the
other hand, the hoarding of goods reects consumer expectations that supplies will run
short and prices will rise in the near future. This indicates that the demand shock and the
supply shock exist alongside each other.
Stockpiling of goods Next, to take a closer look at the stockpiling of goods, Figure 2
shows the year-on-year rate of change in daily sales using point-of-sale (POS) data collected
from about 1,000 supermarkets. The number of newly infected people began to increase
rapidly around February 22, and a government panel of experts on February 24 stated that
the next 1-2 weeks would be critical in terms of whether the outbreak would accelerate
or could be brought under control. Purchases at supermarkets surged on February 24,
reaching a year-on-year rate of increase of 20% at the beginning of March. Shoppers
bought daily necessities such as instant cup noodles, rice, and toilet paper. After that,
however, stockpiling came to an end, the rate of change decreased and has fallen back to
more or less the same level as before the coronavirus outbreak.3
Supermarket prices also started to rise at about the same time as sales (see the left
panel of Figure 3). The year-on-year ination rate was about 0.9% before the coronavirus
shock, but as the frequency of bargain sales and discounts decreased, it increased, reaching
1.4% at the beginning of March. It was still below the 2% target set by the Bank of Japan
but relatively high. However, since then, the year-on-year rate of increase has declined
along with sales and has recently returned to the level before the shock.4
3More recent data indicate that the rate of sales growth began picking up again on March 25, when
Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike warned that Tokyo could be on course for an \explosive spike" in new cases
and hinted at a lockdown of Tokyo.
4More recent data indicate that the ination rate has started to rise again since March 25.
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In fact, these developments in supermarket sales and prices are very similar to those
in the wake of the Tohoku earthquake. At that time, the outlook was uncertain, including
problems at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, and people rushed to stock up. The
right-hand panel of Figure 3 shows sales and prices following the earthquake, indicating
that both sales and ination rst increased and then decreased in a pattern similar to the
current episode. The time it took for sales to normalize was three weeks in the wake of
the earthquake, and it looks like the time for sales to normalize this time around is about
the same. Moreover, not only are the patterns of uctuations similar, the items people
purchased are also very similar. In Figure 4, the horizontal axis shows price movements
following the Tohoku earthquake, while the vertical axis shows recent price movements.
The gure shows that items purchased in large quantities during the current crisis are
daily paper products (toilet paper), instant noodles, bread, etc. - the same items that were
purchased in large quantities following the earthquake.
Declining ination expectations The reason why people stock up on items such as
cup noodles is that they expect such items will be either dicult to obtain or be very
expensive in the future, if they can be obtained at all. The reason why people expect such
items to be dicult to obtain is that they are worried that production will stop. In other
words, the reason for the stockpiling is that although the probability may be very low,
there is an expectation that the coronavirus will lead to the disruption of production in the
future. In this sense, the stockpiling of goods and the accompanying rise in prices suggest
that people anticipated a supply shock.
This raises the question whether the spike in goods prices has led to expectations that
consumer price ination in general will pick up due to the coronavirus shock. In order
to examine this point, Figure 5 shows how the GDP growth and ination forecasts of
professional forecasters changed over time. In the gure, the horizontal axis shows the
date when the forecast was made. Forecasts toward the very right are those made in
March and reect the impact of the coronavirus outbreak on expectations.
Forecasts for GDP growth show a 1 percentage point drop from forecasts in February
(+ 0.3%) and signal that negative growth is expected. Moreover, the ination forecasts are
slightly lower than in February 2020. Similar trends can be seen in the United States and
the euro area. Further, looking at ination expectations estimated from US bond market
data (the breakeven ination rate), these have fallen from about 2% before the coronavirus
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shock to just 1%, indicating a marked decline in ination expectations.
The current decline in ination expectations stands in stark contrast with the time of
the Tohoku earthquake. Following the Tohoku earthquake, as shown in the right panel of
Figure 5, GDP growth forecasts also fell sharply, but ination expectations increased rather
than decreased. Since the Tohoku earthquake was a supply shock caused by the destruction
of capital stock, supply bottlenecks occurred, and as a result prices were expected to rise.
In contrast, during the current crisis, there were concerns about supply bottlenecks for
some items, such as cup noodles and toilet paper, as in the wake of the earthquake, but
such concerns were limited and did not spread to many other products and services. On
the other hand, the sharp decline in demand for F2F industries has pushed down the prices
of these services, and the anticipation that this will continue in the future has given rise
to expectations that consumer prices as a whole will fall.
4 Long-term Economic Damage Caused by the Demand Shock
The Tohoku earthquake destroyed capital stock, and repairing or replacing it took time.
The Spanish u a hundred years ago killed a large number of working-age persons, and this
loss of human capital also took time to replace. Thus, since replacing production factors
such as capital and labor takes time, supply shocks caused by natural disasters can give
rise to a prolonged period of negative or sluggish growth.
In contrast, during the current crisis there are no losses of production factors such as
capital and labor, and it is not expected that such losses will occur in the near future.
Instead, the main cause of the crisis is the decrease in demand for the F2F industries
caused by concerns about the risk of coronavirus infection. Therefore, once such concerns
disappear, the decline in demand should disappear, and the F2F industries should rebound.
However, the stock market does not seem to anticipate such a V-shaped recovery.
This raises the question how a transient public health crisis can lead to a prolonged
economic crisis. Although nothing is certain at the moment, the following scenarios are
possible. The rst is one in which the health crisis triggered by coronavirus infections
develops into a nancial crisis. For example, it has been reported that Boeing's business is
rapidly deteriorating due to the sharp decline in international passengers, and the company
has suspended dividends and may reduce the number of employees. In the F2F industries,
there are many examples of major rms experiencing a similar deterioration in business,
and some of them may actually go bankrupt in the near future. In that case, nancial
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institutions may be aected as loans to such rm become irrecoverable. In fact, the shares
of some nancial institutions have been sold o due to such concerns. Moreover, some
observers believe that central banks such as the Federal Reserve have decided to supply
large amounts of liquidity partly to prepare for this eventuality. At the moment, it is
unclear whether this will happen, but if it does, the nancial system could be damaged
and nancial functions be paralyzed, as during the global nancial crisis. This could lead
to a severe recession followed by prolonged economic stagnation.
A second reason why economies might remain sluggish for a prolonged period is that
demand might not return to the F2F industries once the pandemic has ended. At least
part of the F2F industries were exposed to a wave of technological innovation before the
coronavirus shock occurred and were headed for a decline. For example, the credit card
data show that expenditure on cinemas and theaters has been declining in recent years,
and instead expenditure on online content delivery services has been on the increase. The
coronavirus shock could nish o such industries and rms. In that case, unemployment
and bankruptcies in these industries would continue even once the pandemic is over, leading
to prolonged economic stagnation.
Of course, not all F2F industries will go online in the future and no longer be face
to face. For example, many people nd professional baseball matches or sumo wrestling
tournaments without spectators unattractive. Forms of watching sports where fans go
to the stadium will return once the pandemic is over. On the other hand, with regard
to services that many believed require face-to-face interaction, such as university classes,
remote provision during the coronavirus crisis might lead people to realize that this also
has advantages. Thus, there might be more services than we realize that could be switched
online without diculty.
5 Policy responses
Finally, I would like to touch on how governments and central banks need to respond.
Needless to say, the most important task of governments at this time is to minimize the
human cost. To this end, no expenditure should be spared. A repeat of the tragedy of the
Spanish u a hundred years ago, which claimed the lives of 2% of the global population,
must be avoided at all costs. Minimizing the human cost will also restrain the economic
cost.
In addition, regarding policies focusing on the economy, central banks need to provide
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on-hand liquidity for rms and nancial institutions. Governments need to provide nancial
support to rms in F2F industries that are suering from the deterioration in business,
while providing employment and wage security to workers in these industries. The measures
that the US and European governments and central banks have launched so far generally
go in this direction.
However, these are only provisional measures to address the turmoil in the F2F indus-
tries. The prolonged recession or stagnation feared by the stock market may need to be
dealt with separately. It is necessary to closely watch how unemployment and bankruptcies
in the F2F industries propagate through the economy.
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Figure 1: Credit Card Purchases
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Figure 2: The Number of New Infections in Japan and Supermarket Sales
0
50
100
150
200
250
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2
0
2
0
/1
/1
5
2
02
0
/1
/1
8
2
0
2
0
/1
/2
1
2
0
2
0
/1
/2
4
2
0
2
0
/1
/2
7
2
0
2
0
/1
/3
0
2
0
2
0
/2
/2
2
0
2
0
/2
/5
2
0
2
0
/2
/8
2
0
2
0
/2
/1
1
2
02
0
/2
/1
4
2
0
2
0
/2
/1
7
2
02
0
/2
/2
0
2
0
2
0
/2
/2
3
2
02
0
/2
/2
6
2
0
2
0
/2
/2
9
2
0
2
0
/3
/3
2
0
2
0
/3
/6
2
0
2
0
/3
/9
2
02
0
/3
/1
2
2
0
2
0
/3
/1
5
2
02
0
/3
/1
8
2
0
2
0
/3
/2
1
2
02
0
/3
/2
4
2
0
2
0
/3
/2
7
Number of new infections (right scale)
Y-o-y rate of change in sales (left scale)
Sources: Nowcast Inc., \Nikkei CPINow." NHK News Web.
13
Figure 3: Supermarket Sales and Prices at a Daily Frequency Following
the Coronavirus Shock and Tohoku Earthquake
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Figure 4: Ination Rate by Item during Coronavirus Shock and after To-
hoku Earthquake
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Figure 5: GDP Growth and Ination Forecasts by Professional Forecast-
ers
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